Kontakt
Jak nakupovat
Doručení
Nákupní rádce
Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems under Partial Information
Angličtina
121 b
30 dní na vrácení zboží
Zákazníci také koupili
/
Brožovaná
208
Kč
/
Brožovaná
414
Kč
/
Brožovaná
369
Kč
/
Brožovaná
293
Kč
/
Brožovaná
1 830
Kč
Moral hazard is a key issue in principal-agent literature. Examples lie in several aspects of real life, such as the worker's lack of effort when his/her conduct cannot be directly observed by the employer, and the principal's consequent need to motivate the agent to work as much as possible in his/her best interests. Another example is the relationship between voters and politicians, where elections serve as a disciplining mechanism to prevent rent-seeking behavior by unobserved public administrators. In this work we analyze such problems in a continuous-time setting with a model specification that draws from the classical consumption/investment ŕ la Merton. Agents differ in competence, which is incompletely (but symmetrically) known by all players and learned over time by observing agent's performance. From a mathematical point of view, the analysis uses classical filtering techniques to re-formulate the problem within a complete information setting; then, relying on the dynamic programming principle and by using a guess-and-verify approach, explicit (at least to some extent) solutions are provided.
Informace o knize
Angličtina
Kategorie
Darujte tuto knihu ještě dnes
Je to snadné
1 Přidejte knihu do košíku a zvolte doručit jako dárek 2 Obratem vám zašleme poukaz 3 Kniha dorazí na adresu obdarovanéhoMohlo by vás také zajímat
/
Brožovaná
1 451
Kč
/
Brožovaná
2 646
Kč
/
Pevná
892
Kč
Ahoj! Jsem Libroamiko, tvůj knižní rádce.
Jak ti můžu pomoct?