shared life

Tzvetan TodorovCommunal LifeIf we examine the major currents of European philosophical thought concerning the definition of what is human, we arrive at a curious conclusion: the social dimension, the reality of communal living, is generally inconceivable as a necessity for humanity. Yet, this "e;thesis"e; does not appear as such. Rather, it is an unformulated hypothesis, and its author, for this reason, never had the opportunity to argue it, and we readily accept it nonetheless. Moreover, it forms the common denominator of conflicting and competing theories: whichever side we take in these conflicts, we invariably embrace an isolated, asocial definition of humanity. The various formulations of this asocial view are easily identified. Let us begin with the view of the great moralists of the Classical Age (those who, instead of preaching morality, analyzed behavior), who were themselves the heirs of the thinkers of antiquity. This view presents humanity as a wavering between two states. One represents real life, but it is also the life of our illusions. Man is certainly entangled in the web of social relations, but it is weakness that makes this possible. The other represents our original life, which, even if we attain it only with difficulty, we may, to some extent, be in harmony with the gods, but in relation to other human beings, we are free from them: we have left the superficial disturbances of socialization far behind us. The company of other human beings is a burden one must try to cast off. The contentment that every human being needs is nothing but sinful vanity, which the wise cannot tolerate. The wise yearn for austerity and self-sufficiency.