The Philosophical Limitations of Educational Assessment

This book investigates, from a philosophical perspective, the shortcomings of educational assessment and the potential injustices associated with academic selection based on performance in high-stakes tests. The author uses Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind to argue that capability is a relational rather than an innate characteristic of an individual, and that there is irreducible uncertainty associated with unmeasured capabilities. The case is advanced that the Wittgensteinian critique of assessment compromises the validity and reliability of measurements of academic capabilities derived from tests that purport to assess them. Given these tensions, it is argued that all forms of academic selection predicated upon performance in high-stakes tests have the potential to lead to unfair treatment of some students because of the possibility of a difference between individual students' measured and actual capability levels. As such, it is argued that academic selection based upon performance in high-stakes tests has the potential to perpetrate epistemic injustice against some children and young people. Academic selection based on teacher assessment is also shown to be problematic in relation to the potential for epistemic injustice. Finally, suggestions are offered for the development of more ethically just education systems that eschew academic selection in favour of inclusive policies and practices. The book will appeal to students and scholars in education, with an interest in assessment and testing, and the philosophy of education.